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11.  Introduction
The Asian financial crisis overtook the Korean economy in late 1997. It resulted
in more than 1.5 million people out of work and an International Monetary Fund (IMF)
bailout. Under the dramatic changed economic situation, the new Kim Dae Jung
government, upon its inauguration in 1998, disclosed an extensive economic reform
program highlighted by bold restructuring of Korea’s conglomerates, known as chaebol.1
The state undertook a series of measure to force chaebol to focus their business
operations on a small number of core industries, to rely less on debt financing, to improve
transparency in decision making, and to enhance the accountability of controlling
shareholders and mangers.
In this process, the Director of General Economic Policy Bureau in the Ministry
of Finance and Economy (MOFE) declared that “unlike financial sector reform…the bulk
of corporate sector restructuring, under the principle of a market economy, must be
initiated by the corporate themselves” (Hyun 1999, p.4). Also, according to the report of
Ministry of Finance and Economy (1998, pp.5-6), the Kim Dae Jung government
highlighted the necessity of making “a decisive break with the previous state-led
development model.” President Kim Dae Jung himself often commits to let market force
work, saying that “the lagging development of a democratic, free market economy gave
rise to collusive links between politicians and businessmen as well as a strong tendency
on the part of the government to interfere in the market” (Laurence 1999, pp.366-67).
The rhetoric of bureaucrats and political actors have made them sound like free-market
liberalizers. However, the Kim Dae Jung government has kept up the state’s intrusive
role in shaping the market and business. Despite the regime’s proclamation that it would
not intervene in the corporate restructuring process except to offer ‘basic guidelines,’
there has been mounting evidence of familiar state activism of Korea at various levels.
                                                
1 A chaebol is characterized as a group of large corporate groups operating in diverse and mostly unrelated
industries, usually under the ownership and control of a single family. Many scholars agree that the success
of chaebol has highly depended upon the strong support of the state in challenging cheap credit to favored
chaebol, coordinating investment and export strategies and constraining the labor force (Cheng 1990, Fields
1997, Haggard and Moon 1993, Kim 1997, Wade 1990, and Woo 1991). Under the high growth era of the
1970s and the 1980s, the chaebol were able to borrow more and more capital from financial institutions,
which assumed that the companies would be able to earn enough over time to repay their debts. Yet, when
the growth slowed in 1997, some chaebols with huge debts have collapsed one after another, leaving many
of the leading financial institutions burdened with unrecoverable loans.
2This study examines the extent of state activism in the chaebol reform process of
the Kim Dae Jung government. As an analytic framework to explain state activism in
Korea, I suggest the institutional web, composed of four variables: 1) deep-rooted
ideological orientation of state-led industrial coordination; 2) centralized bureaucratic
system as a function of policy implementation; 3) state’s financial control of the chaebol;
and 4) personalized power of the president’s leadership. These variables are incorporated
into what North calls, “the interdependent web of an institutional matrix” in Korean
political economy (North 1990, p.95). Whereas the Korean state’s chaebol policies have
been not static but dynamic and evolutionary for the last four decades, the pattern of state
activism has been constrained by the institutional web, in which each institution is
interdependent each other and follows its historical path.
While crises may shock countries out of traditional policy choices that are deemed
to have failed and generate demand for radical reform (Williams and Haggard 1994,
pp.562-65), preexisting ideas and institutions powerfully structure the basic direction of
the state’s reform changes. Over the last 40 years, the Korean state’s political actors and
bureaucrats, state policies and regulations, and politics generally have played a crucial
role in how firms and markets developed. Countries with long traditions of governmental
oversight toward industry and intervention view their reform tasks quite differently from
those with an arms-length approach and a legacy of laissez faire. The influences of the
legacy of the past and the institutional constraints on policy makers that are stressed in
the notion of path dependence and embeddedness are particularly in evidence when we
come to discuss dynamic Korea’s chaebol policies. Additionally, although this study
focuses only on the Kim Dae Jung government, future studies are needed at the broad
historical level more focusing on the ‘path dependence’ issues of the state activism.
2. Theoretical Review
This study characterizes institutions as organizations such as bureaucratic
structures, sets of formal rules such as those pertaining to the financial system, time-
sanctioned standard operating procedures, and accepted ways of doing things that are
product of custom and precedent. This definition is similar with Hall’s oft-cited
definition, “formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that
3structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy”
(Hall 1986, p.19).  Furthermore, the institutional model in this study is based on the
concept of ‘embeddedness’ and ‘path dependence,’ which emerge from historical
institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996, Immergut 1998, Pierson and Skocpol 2000, and
Thelen and Steinmo 1992).
For historical institutionalists, since institutional contexts vary from one country
to another, being embedded in their broader societies and rooted in their histories, there is
the divergence among response to common challenges. As Orru argues, “the institutional
factors result from a combination of sociocultural, financial, political, and economic traits
that are often linked with each other at multiple levels, and are, therefore, hard to isolate
in clear fashion” (Orru 1997, p.349). Thus, “small changes or changes in one area that
leave the other components of these national systems untouched do not bring about
convergence” (Woolcock 1998, p.195).
Moreover, historical institutionalists regard institutions as the legacy of concrete
historical process. According to them, once an institution is formed, it is difficult to
change even when the specific circumstances that brought the organization into existence
have changed.2 Historical institutionalists emphasize that previous choice has a
determining power over the next behavior in that later decision cannot reverse the
previous one- the path dependent character of social and political transformation within
individual national societies.3 For them, institutions are “relatively persistent features of
the historical landscape and one of the central factors pushing historical development
along a set of paths” (Hall and Taylor 1996, p.941). Thus, institutional arrangements at a
point in time are “both a dependent variable at time t and an independent variable at time
t+1,” in order words, prior institutional choices condition future options and institutional
                                                
2 For example, Ikenberry (1989) conceptualizes the institutional continuity with two ways: at the macro
level, institutional reform is carried out within the existing array of organizations and structures that shape
and constrain any effects to change; at the micro level, individuals within the organization seek to preserve
and protect their missions and responsibilities even when underlying social forces continue to evolve.
3 Path dependence suggests the dynamics of self-reinforcing or positive feedback in a political system-
what economists call “increasing returns” processes (Pierson 2000). Once established, patterns of politics,
the institutional ‘rules of the game,’ and the public’s ways of thinking about the political world would often
produce self-reinforcing dynamics. Here, time and sequence of particular events or processes matter since
self-reinforcing processes affecting a particular aspect of political and social life can generate the
consequences of later developments in a sequence (Pierson and Skocpol 2000, p.11).
4capacities are “a product of choices made during some earlier period” (Krasner 1988,
pp.71-72).
While path dependence does not mean that continued stability is inevitable, the
direction of the change is limited by the norms and rules, and other institutional
arrangements which are intricately linked at any moment in time. As Chang, Park and
Yoo (1998) remind us, the distinctive German and Japanese economic systems emerged
from a period of the American Occupation Authority and Occupation-led institutional
and legal reforms. Even concerted attempts at institutional transfer can lead to different
outcomes.
Indeed, the profound influence of institutional embeddedness and historical
contingency or path dependence tempers the enthusiasm of the Kim Dae Jung
government facing economic crisis. Thus, through an analysis of the Korean state’s
activism  vis-à-vis the chaebol, this study examines the web of “preexisting institutions
(which) play a key role in shaping response to exogenous factors by acting as a filter or
intervening variable between external pressures and the responses to them” (Regini 2000,
p.8). Before analyzing the institutional web model, the next section shows major chaebol
policies under the Kim Dae Jung government.
3. Current Chaebol Policy Issues- Five and Three Tasks of Restructuring
When the Kim Dae Jung government concluded that one of the causes of the
economic crisis was the excessive expansion and diversification of the chaebol, it
launched a highly ambitious reform program in 1998. On January 13, 1998, President
Kim Dae Jung reached on agreement with four chaebol leaders on ‘Five Tasks of
Business Restructuring’ (Chosun Ilbo, January 13, 1998). The five tasks are to enhance
transparency in corporate management, to strengthen the accountability of major
shareholders, to eliminate cross-debt guarantees among a chaebol’s subsidiaries, to
improve capital structure of corporations, and to specialize in a smaller number of core
business lines. Afterwards, the state led the way in chaebol restructuring through the
revision of related legislation to facilitate the five tasks and the periodic check of the
progress in those agreed tasks. Several laws related to chaebol restructuring such as the
5Commercial Law and the Securities Exchange Law were revised in February 1998 (Black
et al. 2000, and H.W. Kim 1999).
On August 15, 1999, after the celebration of Korea’s Liberation Day, President
Kim Dae Jung added three supplementary tasks, without the agreement of the chaebol
leaders this time, to the initial five tasks to correct ‘undesirable’ aspects of the chaebol’s
management practices. The three tasks are to restrict the chaebol from controlling the
financial industry, to suppress obscure internal transactions and circular shareholding
among their subsidiaries within a chaebol, and to prevent ad hoc inheritance of the top
shareholder’s shares to his or her siblings (Chosun Ilbo August 15, 1999).
Based on these eight principles, we can divide two different aspects to the chaebol
restructuring. The first is about internal corporate governance, separating management
control from ownership to promote professional management. The second is about
external organization, dismantling the group structure to make subsidiaries independent.
The state officially denies that it is pursuing the first objective and insists that its position
be on organizational reform. President Kim Dae Jung has indicated more than once that
he has no plans to change the size or purpose of the chaebol (Korea Herald, June 2, 1998
and July 11, 1998). Ministry of Finance and Economy, Lee Kyu Sung, said that Kim’s
reforms were not aimed at diminishing the power and size of the chaebol, but rather at
using various incentives and tax reductions to encourage restructuring (Korea Herald,
April 10, 1998). However, many of policy measures suggest that the state is seeking out
both goals (Yoo 2000).
Legal standards related to internal corporate governance are strengthened to
ensure transparency and accountability of management in five areas: outside director
system, responsibility of controlling shareholders, rights of minority shareholders, rights
of institutional shareholders, and accounting standards. First, clauses related to securities
listing are revised to require all listed companies on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) to
appoint independent directors, which should exclude people who share the same interests
with the controlling shareholder. Its revision aims to rectify the practice of illicit control
of the firm through proxy equity participation (Black et al. 2000, p.13).
Second, the revised Korean Commercial Law (KCL) includes a clause stipulating
the ‘duty of loyalty’ of directors and removes the Chairman’s Secretary Office (CSO) of
6the chaebol. The CSO was the core body to sustain the owner-chairman’s centralized
control of the member companies with arrangement and coordination of internal trading
and cross-subsidization among member companies. Also, the state encourages the
registration of the chaebol’s owner-chairman as the representative director of at least one
of the member companies. Although owner-chairmen of the chaebol exercised absolute
control over their subsidiaries, they were not formally members of the boards of directors
of any of these companies and were thus not legally liable for the damage that their
actions may have caused. Thanks to the revised KCL, owner-chairmen are required to
assume formal CEO status with full legal responsibilities and thus can be held legally
accountable for all their managerial decisions.
Third, to strengthen voting rights of minority shareholders who had been largely
ignored, the state revised Securities Exchange Law to lowering the minimum
shareholdings required in demanding financial review, removal of directors, and taking
legal action against managerial abuse. Additionally, KCL introduces a cumulative voting
system when directors are appointed. As a result, it becomes easier for minority
stockholders to monitor corporate decision making by demanding accountability from
controlling owners.4
Fourth, the role of institutional investors as monitors of corporate management is
strengthened as Securities Investment Trust Law is revised with endowment of voting
rights for shares in funds managed by investment trust companies and bank trust accounts
(Black et al. 2000, p.66).
Finally, Corporate External Audit Law (CEAL) is revised to improve the
accounting system. The reliability of Korean firms’ accounting data had become an issue
since murky accounting practices, allowing firms to bypass investment and transfer-
                                                
4 Each requirement of shareholdings is loosened from 1 percent to 0.005 percent for class action suits, from
3 percent to 0.5 percent for inspecting the accounting books, and from 1 to .25 percent for the request of
dismissal of directors and auditors. These changes initiates new shareholder activism in Korea that is led by
citizen groups representing minority shareholders, and sometimes even foreign investors. The chaebol also
steps up their efforts to establish shareholder-oriented management practices. For example, the annual
shareholders meeting of Samsung Electronics took more than 13 hours due to active discussion on
corporate governance issue (Chosun Ilbo, March 28, 1998). In February 1999, Samsung Electronics
executives agreed to most of the requests of minority shareholder activists at the general meeting and
decided to institute an interim divided system and a regulatory mechanism for internal trading (Chosun
7pricing restrictions, had discouraged foreign investors from investing in them. Thus,
accounting standards for the 30 largest chaebols are revised to bring them into
compliance with combined financial statements, based on International Accounting
Standards or United States Generally Accepted Principles. These combined financial
statements would provide more accurate information about the chaebol finances by
showing internal transactions among their subsidiaries, including their cross-
shareholdings and mutual-payment guarantees. Furthermore, the CEAL adds the
obligation of establishing an election committee for the assignment of outside auditors for
the top thirty chaebols and all listed companies on the KSE. Similarly it increases the
penalty of outside auditors for the wrongdoings and permits shareholders’ class action
suits against them.
Regarding the chaebol’s external business structure, the state’s reform measures
focused on two areas: M&A market and the chaebol’s capital structure. First, to revitalize
the domestic M&A market, the state completely abolished the obligation public purchase
of shares during the takeover, and restrictions on the total amount of shareholdings a
company can have in other companies, through the amendment of Securities Exchange
Law and Fair Trade Law. Moreover, M&A activity, which involves foreign firms, is
promoted by the revised Foreign Investment Law. The procedure of authorization by the
Ministry of Finance and Economy for large-scale foreign direct investment is lifted,
except for defense industry companies. Foreign investors are also able to buy up to 33%
of the total share of a company without approval of current board of directors (Kim 1999,
pp.76-7).
The second category aims to improve financial conditions of the chaebol since the
high level of corporate debt and the common practice of cross-debt guarantees among
subsidiaries belonging to a chaebol were considered to main factors in the financial
weakness of the banking system.5 Due to amendments of the Fair Trade Law, cross-debt
                                                                                                                                                
Ilbo, February 20, 1999). Similarly, SK Telecom accepted minority shareholders’ request for managerial
transparency (Chosun Ilbo, March 27, 1998).
5 The practice of cross-debt guarantees allowed subsidiaries of the chaebol to provide loan guarantees for
them, often without collateral. Since the guarantees did not appear on the balance sheet of the guarantor,
this practice enabled the chaebol to accumulate a higher level of debt than was recorded in their financial
statements.
8guarantees were to be abolished by March 2000 and any new issue of cross-debt
guarantees is prohibited. Also, the Capital Structure Improvement Agreement is signed
between creditor banks and their partner chaebols under the state guidance. It covers a
reduction in the debt-to-equity ratios to 200% by the year 1999, a clause for the banks’
overseeing of companies’ new investment, and encouragement of the choice of core
industry by the chaebol.
As the result of the state’s push, there have been huge changes in many areas of
the chaebol’s structure. Management transparency has been enhanced through extensive
revision of the legislation relating to the corporate governance structure, while their
financial stability and capital structure have been improved through the abolition of debt-
guarantees and the reduction of debt-to-equity ratios. The four largest chaebols cut their
total number of subsidiaries from 232 in 1997 to 137 in 1999 (Korea Times April 11,
2000).6 Hyundai and LG cut their debt-to-equity ratios to 181 percent and 184.2 percent,
respectively and Samsung and SK registered debt-to-equity ratio of 161 percent and
166.3 percent as of 2000 (Chosun Ilbo April 13, 2000).
It is the first time that a reform of the chaebol’s internal governance structure has
been undertaken so seriously by the state. A series of revisions of corporate law is a good
example of formal institutionalized reform. In the past, chaebol policies centered mainly
on financial and business restructuring, that is, industrial adjustment or company
ownership change by force.
Although it is undeniable that the Kim Dae Jung government has made many
changes in the chaebol structure, it has adopted familiar activist approaches during the
reform process. The next three sections show its activist measures, depending on four
different institutions, such as the ideology of state-led industrialization, financial
institutions and bureaucratic system, and personalized president’s leadership style.
4. State-led Industrial Coordination
Kim Dae Jung regime’s chaebol restructuring policy is resembles with deep-
rooted practice of state-led industrial coordination. In addition above various sets of
                                                
6 Among top five chaebols, in July 1999, Daewoo went into virtual bankruptcy.
9measure of chaebol reform, another element of the restructuring process involves massive
mergers and swaps of companies and business lines among the five largest chaebols
including Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo, LG and SK.7 This is called as a Big Deals
program. Considering over-diversified business areas and excess productivity capacities
as the major problem in the low profitability of the chaebol and in the less
competitiveness of the nation’s economy, the state forced the chaebol to focus on a few
specialized businesses through mergers of their subsidiaries.
On July 1998, there was an agreement on the Big Deals among the top five
chaebols at a meeting between the state and the chaebol (Y.R. Lee 1999, pp.91-97).
Immediately after the meeting, the Federation of Korean Industries, an association of the
chaebol, announced a sweeping business swap plan among 17 companies belonging to
the 5 largest chaebols in the seven industrial sectors of aerospace, oil refining,
petrochemicals, power plant equipment, railway vehicles, semiconductors, and ship
engines. However, the Big Deals did not go forward due to disputes among those
chaebols that were reluctant to give up their business or were not satisfied about the
selling price of their business.
On December 1998, again, an agreement between the state and the top five
chaebols was made for a speedier implementation plan for the Big Deals (Y.R. Lee 1999,
pp.219-234). The business swap of Daewoo Electronics and Samsung Motors between
Daewoo and Samsung was additionally added to the program. The final decision was
composed of 13 companies belonging to the top five chaebols, excluding SK, and three
non-top five chaebol companies, Korea Heavy Industries, Hanhwa Energy, and Hanjin
Heavy Industries. The revenue size of those targeted companies under the Big Deals was
7.4 percent of the national GDP in 1998 (Joongang Ilbo February 20, 1999). Table 1 lists
the major Big Deals proposed and the results to date.
                                                
7 Different restructuring approaches were applied according to the scale of the chaebol. The top five
chaebols were to follow a program named the ‘Big Deals,’ whereas for the 6th to 64th largest chaebols,
restructuring was to be carried through the program named the ‘Workout.’ The top five chaebols have
separate status from other smaller chaebols since their financial resilience affects their position vis-à-vis the
state. Moreover, since their business activities involved key sectors and they are linked to hundreds of
subcontractors, their economic influence is even greater than their size would suggest. Thus, these five
chaebols have been a target of more extensive reforms than other corporations and the Kim Dae Jung
government has made reform of the top five chaebols a top priority.
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The main impetus for such mergers is to alleviate over-investment problem and
the resulting over-competition among the chaebol through business swaps by which a
surviving company created through a merger can concentrate on its core business but
with a much bigger size and a fewer number of companies. The state officially
announced that the Big Deals in the private sector should be implemented based on
market rules and mutual agreements between involved companies. For example, when he
met the U.S. Trade Representative, the chairman of the FSC, Chun Yun Chul, said that
“Big Deals in Korea have been done under market principles and the Korea state had not
intervened in the process” (Korea Economic Daily, October 15, 1998). However, the state
exerted a strong influence toward the Big Deal since its early stage. For example, the
Minister of Industry and Resources, Park Tae Young, determined that the semiconductor
industry was an over-invested sector, which needed to be restructured (Chosun Ilbo,
November 12, 1998). Rather than leaving the discipline of market mechanism, the state
identified a number of target industries.
The state’s demand for a large-scale swap program is deeply rooted in its
ideological orientation, which is basically the same as the economic logic of the 1970s
and 1980s. Table 2 shows that, over the last 30 years, diverse types of industrial
rationalization have been carried out under the coordination of the state: company
rationalization and industrial rationalization under the Park government of the 1970s;
heavy industry adjustment program under the Chun government of the early 1980s; and
core business specialization under the Roh and Kim Young Sam government of the 1990s
(J.W. Lee 1999, p.253). The state’s industrial coordination programs are regular,
resurfacing repeatedly as subject for state activism toward the chaebol. In the process of
forcefully implementing industrial adjustment, cooperative companies have been
compensated with preferential treatment such as privileged loans and tax exemptions.
This time, as an incentive for taking part in the swap deals, debt-to-equity swaps are
provided to the chaebol.
These state-led industrial coordination programs are based on the general public
attitude supporting state intervention in economy and control-oriented economic
principles outlined in the Constitution. First, the chaebol have only limited popular
support. The average Korean citizen believes that the chaebol are too big and a source of
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corruption (Cho 1997, pp.217-224). Additionally, they believe that the chaebol are
responsible for bringing on the current crisis. Under the situation in which the public
response to economic collapse was a sense of national humiliation, many ordinary
Koreans donated their own personal wealth in an effort to bail out the economy and
wanted to return a degree of national autonomy. A 1999 Gallup survey commissioned by
Monthly Joongang (February 1999) revealed that 45.3 percent of the public approved the
direct use of state intervention in the restructuring the chaebol while only 28.8 percent
agreed with market-based reform and 22.4 percent with indirect control via financial
institutions. Furthermore, the chaebol’s owners and their family members tend to be
ostracized by society, which takes it for granted that the state would intervene in the
personal affairs of chaebol families, admonishing them for their extravagant life-style and
mediating in conflicts between family members over the issue of inheritance. This kind of
public attitude highly pressures the state directly intervening not only in the business but
also corporate structure.
Furthermore, in the Korean Constitution there is a separate chapter on economic
matters, Article 119 through 127 in Chapter 9. The economic provisions of the
Constitution grant the state virtually unlimited authority and control, to such an extent
that all economic policies pursued by the state can be legally justified (Weekly Donga
December 9, 1999). With the exception of Section 1 of Article 119, these articles provide
the state with the power to guide and control the economy for specific national purposes.
Particularly, Section 2 of Article 119 indicates “the State may regulate and coordinate
economic affairs for the balanced growth and stabilization of national economy,
maintenance of fair distribution of income, prevention of market domination and abuse of
economic power, and the democratization of economy through the coordination between
economic bodies” (Yang 1994, p.962). Despite nine constitutional amendments, the
underlying nature of the Korean Constitution in terms of advocating control of the
economy has changed little since 1945. The basic promise of the Constitution is that the
economic order is a means to achieve national goals and the public laws should prevail
over private interests as long as they are enacted by majority of the National Assembly
(Min 1999). The nationalization of banks, preferential treatment through financial support
and taxation, licensing and granting approval for market entry are all authorized and
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justified under the Constitution. The example of the Big Deals policy shows Kin Dae
Jung government is also trapped with ideology of state-led industrial coordination,
resulting from general public attitude and the Constitution. In the Big Deals, the state
guided and forced swaps among the chaebol, determining the acquiring and acquired
companies in advance and giving them the guidelines and deadlines to be met.
5. Financial Control through the Centralized Bureaucratic System- Business as Usual
As with previous regimes, the Kim Dae Jung government centralizes powerful
role of executive branch to facilitate its reform drive. First of all, outside of the central
bank, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) was established in April 1998 to
function as a neutral and independent supervisory and policy-making body (E.M. Kim
2000). The FSC was expanded into the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) in January
1999 by merging four existing supervisory bodies, including the Banking Supervisory
Authority, Securities Supervisory Board, Insurance Supervisory Board and Non-Bank
Supervisory Authority. The FSC is established as an independent supervisory
organization with broad powers over the full range of business. It is given the power to
monitor, discipline and control financial institutions except for the authority to make and
revise financial laws, which is still held by the MOEF. For example, the FSC has the
authority to issue business licenses for financial institutions, the authority to review the
appointment of bank chairs, and the authority to look into corporate bank accounts
without obtaining search warrants from the courts.8
Armed with these exclusive powers, the FSC plays a key role in steering financial
reform programs and chaebol reforms. Indeed, it is the state’s main organizational
weapon to enforce the highly problematic deals between the chaebol. Since most of the
banks to which the chaebol owe a large amount of outstanding debt are heavily dependent
on state’s subsidies for their restructuring, they are willing to exert pressure on the
chaebol at the FSC’s request. Thus, the FSC represents the resurrection of the state-
controlled financial sector of the developmental era.
                                                
8 The state monitors the FSC with appointing officials and allocating the budget. At the same time, it owns
many of the financial institutions, which are constituents of the FSC. Thus, a regulatory agency of the state
regulates a state-owned banking sector.
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In addition, the state empowers the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) with new
institutional provisions such as the right to look into bank accounts of the chaebol and the
right to look into the internal financial transactions among chaebol’s member firms to
take heavy punitive measures in the case of infringement. Then, the FTC launched
investigation three times into illegal internal transactions among the five largest chaebols
and imposed a total 100 billion won in surcharges (Joongang Ilbo August 12, 1999). The
FTC is also charged with monitoring the swaps to prevent delays in restructuring. The
chaebol consider as the serious pressure, statements made by high ranking officials of
FTC or FSC in which they said that government would take a knife to the chaebol, and
administrative sudden decisions to investigate subsidiaries’ internal dealings (Chosun
Ilbo, 1998, May 8).9
For example, in the process of the merger between Hyundai Electronics and LG
Semiconductors, the consolidated bureaucratic system used its formal and informal
activism for the goal of Big Deals. The forced merger between LG Semiconductors and
Hyundai semiconductors was initially resisted by the LG, which was required to sell its
equities to Hyundai. LG protested that the value of its company was actually greater than
that of Hyundai (Chosun Ilbo December 26, 1998). It also pointed out that the takeover of
LG Semiconductor by Hyundai was inconsistent with the state’s big deal guidelines,
which clearly prescribed that relatedness among business areas was a core criterion.
However, LG reluctantly agreed to hand over its semiconductor business only after the
state threatened to take strong punitive measures such as the early recall of its bank loans
and the prohibition of future loans (Chosun Ilbo December 19, 1998). Later in the
                                                
9 However, the Kim Dae Jung government has adopted different rules each time that important decisions
are needed, using circumstantial necessity as an excuse. For instance, the FSC put off a comprehensive
audit into subsidiaries of Hyundai on November 2000 when Hyundai experienced a liquidity problem. It
announced that “given unfavorable situations facing Hyundai, the FSC decided to indefinitely postpone the
inspection originally scheduled to begin in this month, but it would conduct an audit into financial units of
Samsung next month as planned” (Korea herald November 8, 2000). Another, when Hyundai Engineering
and Construction (HEC)’s liquidity problem dragged on, the state stepped into persuade the head of
Hyundai Motors to help HEC. The chairman of FSC, Lee Keun Young, met with owner-manager of
Hyundai Motors, Chung Mong Koo, to ask him to help his brother’s company on November 14, 2000
(Chosun Ilbo, November 24, 2000). But, in the wake of the sibling battle over management control of
Hyundai, Hyundai Motors and its affiliates were already separated from the Hyundai Group on August
2000, virtually becoming an independent chaebol. While pressing the chaebol to spin off their subsidiaries,
the state asked the independent corporate to support it’s past mother company.
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negotiations between the LG and Hyundai agreement could not reached about the proper
price for LG Semiconductors. Since Hyundai and LG first announced their plans for a
merger of semiconductor industries on September 3, 1998, the bureaucracies, such as
MOFE, the FSC, and the FTC, were very critical of the slow pace and partial nature of
the merger compared to other sectors. On October 12, 1998, the Ministry of the MOFE,
Lee Gyu Seong, announced that the semiconductor industry would be included in the
workout programs and warned strong restriction on this sector, using suspension and
withdrawal of credit or limitation of corporate bills (Chosun Ilbo, September 14, 1998).
Then, the major trading banks for Hyundai and LG, the Commercial Bank of Korea and
the Korea Exchange Bank, began to limit credit to these two firms (Chosun Ilbo,
December 28, 1998). In order to put pressure on the deadlocked negotiations, President
Kim also declared that the state might apply ‘workout,’ forced restructuring preceded by
the removal of management control from the owners, to the chaebol that failed to keep
their promises about these deals (Chosun Ilbo April 15, 1999). This resulted in the LG
and Hyundai agreeing on the price of LG Semiconductors on April 23, 1999 (Chosun
Ilbo April 23, 1999).
As we see the example of the merger process between Hyundai and LG, in
addition to bureaucratic system, the state has used its control over the banks to force the
chaebol to improve their financial structure and streamline their business activities. Since
the direct cause of the economic crisis was the crippled financial sector, the Kim Dae
Jung government first targeted to reform the financial sector. During this financial reform
process, the state not only strengthened its regulatory power over financial institutions
but gained additional influence by becoming a shareholder in the financial institutions
that is bailed out with public funds. The state took control of commercial banks,
insurance companies, and investment trust companies through an equity-debt swap in
1998. By purchasing non-performing loans and through the injection of public funds, the
state has become the largest shareholder for most commercial banks. For example, its
percent of holding stock are 95.7 percent of Cho Hung Bank, 95.3 percent of Han Il
Bank, 94.2 percent of Commercial Bank, 93.8 percent of Korea First Bank, 93.8 percent
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of Seoul Bank, 33.6 percent of Foreign Exchange Bank, 16.1 percent of Housing Bank,
and 10.4 percent of Kukmin Bank as of June 1998 (Chosun Ilbo June 19, 1998).10
Many of the state’s initiatives toward the chaebol are based on its ability to
control credit of financial institutions over the chaebol. The state has not been reluctant to
exercise its ownership right of financial institutions in forcing chaebol restructuring.
From February to April 1998, many agreements were made between their main creditor
banks and 57 subsidiaries of the chaebol owing more than 250 billion won on the matter
of capital structure restructuring. The main context of the agreement between the banks
and those companies was the reduction of the chaebol’s debt-to-equity ratio to 200
percent by the end of 1999, their business restructuring, and a clause for the banks’
overseeing of the chaebol’s new investment. Officially, these agreements between the
banks and the chaebol were voluntary, but there was no doubt that the state was deeply
involved. To induce corporations to reduce outstanding debt, the creditor banks directed
the chaebol to sell some of their member companies and assets or attracting foreign
investment. However, as Mo and Moon (1999) criticize, while the banks have a role to
play in the management of the firms to which they lend, it is not appropriate for the banks
to force their debtors to give up business lines and reduce debt ratios when the debtors are
not formally in default.
A policy measure halting the injection of new capital to the financially distressed
corporations would be sufficient for the state to bring them into the state-drawn reform
programs, since the most debt-ridden corporations would be pushed to the brink of
collapse during economic recession (Haggard, Maxfield, and Schneider 1997). According
to the report of the Korean Development Institute (Laurence 1999, p.367), six of the 30
largest chaebols kept afloat by bank loans given under state guidance. Moreover,
threatening a corporation with the cutoff of capital is credible when the chaebol, upon
receiving various demands from their main creditor banks, cannot turn to another bank
since no bank is in a position to help them against the wishes of the state (Mo and Moon,
1999, pp.161-163). As their main creditors, the banks now have enormous power over the
chaebol; they can virtually bankrupt firms by cutting off their creditors. Thus, as of
                                                
10 Among them, Korea First Bank was sold off to New Bridge Capital, a U.S.-based vulture fund, on
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December 1999, Daewoo, which once had 37 subsidiaries in diverse industries and
ranked as the second largest asset holder in Korea, was virtually dissolved its 12 major
firms under workout programs.
At the same time, although there were innumerable points of conflict between the
state and the chaebol, the state never allowed a complete breakdown of the chaebol. The
state follows a pragmatic approach toward a particular chaebol, considering it as
backbone of the nation’s economy. The current preferential loans for Hyundai are a good
example. Although state officials have repeatedly stressed their willingness to allow
creditor banks to determine the fate of terminally ailing companies by market principles,
the state-influenced banks have continually extended preferential loans to keep Hyundai’s
subsidiaries afloat. On March 12, 2001, creditor banks announced to extend financial
aids, totaling about $2.47 billion, to Hyundai Electronics Industries (HEI), Hyundai
Engineering and Construction (HEC), and Hyundai Petrochemicals (HP) through debt
rollovers, new credit and extension of new trade financing (Chosun Ilbo March 21, 2001).
For example, the 17 credit banks, led by Korea Exchange Bank (KEB) allowed
HEI with free access to trade-related loans of up to $1.98 billion by the end of 2001 and
extended the maturity of 300 billion won of HEI loans, most in overdrafts, for 2002. With
regard to HEC suffering from chronic liquidity shortage, state-run Korea Development
Bank (KDB) extended $400 million in payment guarantees for the ailing contractors’
overseas borrowing and projects, with the KEB and six other lenders guaranteeing the
payment of $200 million of them to KDB. The creditor banks also decided to give a six-
month extension on the repayment of HP’s debts maturing by the end of June, 2001 and
infused 115 billion won in loans to the ailing petrochemical unit for period of six months,
taking the firm’s plants and real estate assets as security.
Since there has been liquidity problems of Hyundai on May 2000, this newest
bailout is the fifth assistance of the state (Joongang Ilbo March 22, 2001). Each time the
state repeatedly emphasized that it would be the last time for Hyundai.11 The state tends
                                                                                                                                                
December 27, 1999 (Chosun Ilbo December 27, 1999).
11 For example, the state and creditor banks said that they would provide no more funds to Hyundai when
they announced a support plan for the company, which included 800 billion won, in January 2001 (Chosun
Ilbo, January 21, 2001). The chairman of the FSC also confirmed at the time that there would be no
17
to fear that Hyundai is simply too big to fail and its collapse could touch off a chain-
reaction of economic havoc: Domestic projects like nuclear power plants and other
infrastructure projects involving Hyundai would stall; as overseas projects fell of
schedule, the contractors would be subject to massive lawsuits and claims; and banks that
provided performance guarantees worth billions of dollars on behalf of Hyundai overseas
could be pushed closer to insolvency. For instance, an official of the Blue House, the
presidential office, announced that “we are doing what is deemed necessary to save
companies leading the country’s strategic industries. I do not think that there is anybody
in the country who wants to see Hyundai fail” (Korea Times February 7, 2001). The
Minister of Finance and Economy directly highlighted that “there would be no more
bankruptcies of the chaebol like Daewoo’s fall in 1999” and “the liquidity crunch of
Hyundai was not serious” (Chosun Ilbo July 23, 2000). Another official of the Blue
House said that “Hyundai is different from Daewoo. Its semiconductors and constructions
are Korea’s backbone industries. These firms hold large market shares of their industries
and these businesses are deeply linked with other domestic companies. Thus, these firms
should not be sold off just to follow market principles” (Joongang Ilbo January 16,
2001). However, many newspapers’ editorials compared the state’s repeated support to
Hyundai to ‘pouring water into a bottomless water’ (Chosun Ilbo March 11, 2001,
Hankuk Ilbo March 12, 2001, and Joongang Ilbo March 12, 2001).12
                                                                                                                                                
additional help, since “without the provision of the remaining 200 billion won, Hyundai would have no
liquidity problems” (Chosun Ilbo, January 22, 2001).
12 There are various political behind-the-scene stories and rumors regarding the Kim Dae Jung
government’s support to Hyundai. Among them, there is strong relationship between Kim Dae Jung
government’s engagement policy of North Korea and Hyundai. The biggest achievement of Kim’s
engagement policy is North Korea’s October 1998 agreement to permit Hyundai to bring South Korean
tourists abroad cruise ships to Mount Kumkang in North Korea. To arrange these visits, Hyundai agreed to
pay North Korea $150 million over the first six months. But, the Hyundai’s tourism business of Mt.
Kumkang is widely seen as one of the causes of its liquidity problems. As of January 2001, Hyundai Asan,
the Hyundai’s North Korea business unit, has spent an estimated $624 million, including $342 million in
monthly tourism fees, $156 million in operations of the cruise ships and $126 million in facility investment,
but earned only $233 million from the business (Korea Herald January 21, 2001). It is said that the
President decided to allow preferential loans to Hyundai to keep his engagement policy and the state is
likely to indirectly help Hyundai’s North Korea project unit over its unprofitable tourism business. For
example, an official of the Ministry of Unification said, “we will ask North Korea to help Hyundai Asan, at
the inter-Korean ministerial-level talks” (Joongang Ilbo March 12, 2001). Indeed, the Kim Dae Jung
government intends to ‘reviving Hyundai first, no question asked.’
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There has been active state participation in commercial bank credit allocation,
which is used to bring the chaebol into the state-drawn reform programs and/or to prevent
a particular chaebol from going bankrupt. Before the economic crisis, state control of the
banking sector has persisted despite financial deregulation of the 1990s. The asset
portfolios of banks were still consisted by limits on lending and, although the banking
sector had been largely privately owned since the mid-1980s, the state did not allow it to
have full managerial autonomy.
Although the state-owned banks are considered as being temporary and necessary
part of the transition period, it is unlikely that the state stake in the financial sector will
diminish in the near future. Directors of commercial banks are not accustomed to
autonomous decision making on important issues and tend to continue relying on state
officials. These tendencies show that changing patterns of behavior and institutional
traditions will take a much longer time than is thought.
6. The President’s Personalized Leadership Style
As seen above, state activism vis-à-vis the chaebol can be simplified three steps:
meeting of President and chaebol leaders, the Minister’s open denouncements and real
pressure through financial institutions and other state agencies. During this process, the
President extensively intervened in the economic policy-making process with well-
defined and concentrated power. Moreover, the economy-related power of the president
is highly strengthened under Kim Dae Jung government since President Kim consolidates
power around the Blue House, creating the Planning and Budget Commission (PBC),
which he makes directly subordinate to the Blue House, and the FSC, which he places
outside MOFE. The president uses these agencies, rather than the MOFE as his key
agents of reform.
The presidential office has been the predominant center of policy decision-making
procedures since the Park era (Hahm and Plein 1997). Almost every single significant
power has been concentrated in the hands of the President, who is virtually unchecked by
any other institution. The President has been able to mobilize power apparatus, such as
the National Intelligence Service (NIS, previously the Agency for National Security
Planning), the Attorney General (AG), the Chief of Police Bureau (CPB), and the Office
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of National Tax Administration (ONTA) at his discretion, to deal with his political
opponents and to force through his economic agenda. Although the economic
transformation and democratic transition since the late 1980s largely undermined
presidential power by setting institutional constraints on the president and bringing the
presidential office under democratic rules, the President himself has remained the single
most important institution. Particularly, major policies around the chaebol still remain in
the hands of the president. An important pattern that has been repeated in the case of
policy vis-à-vis the chaebol is the dominance of the President, over the economic
bureaucracy and other governing institutions in the decision making and implementation
process.
For examples, after the series of aircraft accidents of the Korean Air Line (KAL),
the President Kim stated that the KAL, the subsidiary of Hanjin, should be managed by
professional staff, not as a family run business and concentrate on providing an efficient
and safe service for its customers (Chosun Ilbo, April 21, 1999). Some critics argue that
the President’s calling for a management reshuffling at KAL was inappropriate
intervention in private business, overstepping the bounds of his authority, and there is no
relationship between ownership structure and ‘an efficient and safe service.’ However,
President’s order was faithfully executed after the ONTA announced the imposition of
541.6 billion won penalty against subsidiaries of Hanjin, including KAL, and their
management for evading taxes and amassing a number of secret slush funds (Chosun
Ilbo, October 4, 1999). The owner-chairman of Hanjin, Cho Jung Hoon, was resigned and
the family management was out of KAL’s daily operations.
President Kim has continued the established tradition of informal arrangements,
rather than formal procedures, in deciding major policy issues. Blue House talks between
the President and the chaebol’s owner-chairmen are often used to lay out reform
programs with businesses at each phase and to verify progress on these programs. The
President often used his supreme power at these meetings to dissolve deadlocks among
the chaebol, banks and the government. The first meeting, in January 1998, laid out the
five reform targets concerning the chaebol. The meeting in August 1998 put pressure on
the foot-dragging chaebol. The meeting in December 1998 was used to settle the big
deals among the five largest chaebols. The meeting in April 1999 was used to determine
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whether or not the reform agreements of state-business were proceeding as planned. The
meeting in August 1999 was used to reach the contractual agreement of three new reform
targets.13 The sequence of the Blue House meeting clearly shows that informal
administrative guidance and the personalized presidential system in Korea.
The nature of negotiation with the chaebol leaders were also informal and closed
when they agreed with five principles of reform on the first meeting, leading some
observers to wonder whether the chaebol leaders had any choice but to agree. President
Kim called the chairmen of five largest chaebols to the Blue House to get the word
straight from the president’s lips: Divest yourselves of poor-performing subsidiaries;
reduce your debt-to-equity ratios toward the end of this year; and eliminate debt
guarantees between subsidiaries. Repeatedly, President Kim warned the chaebol to put
their reform programs into action at press conferences and face-to face meetings with
chairmen of the chaebol in the Blue House. One of chaebol tycoons told that he was not
expecting President Kim to be so personally involved (Asiaweek, February 23, 1999).
Although there is no question that the Kim Dae Jung government is democratic,
President Kim has maintained a commanding position in the process of chaebol policy
implementation. Accordingly, some scholars criticize the policy style of President Kim
Dae Jung as “command and control” (Haggard et al. 1999), “imperial power” (S.H. Kim
2000b), and “unlimited and top-down” (Mo and Moon 1999). In spite of democratization
since the late 1980s, politics in Korea is still characterized by the personality-dominated
system that articulates the interest of its top leaders. Weak party system and region-based
politics contribute to the personalized presidential leadership.
First, political parties in Korea are organized around their leaders, and the party
operations tend to be personality-driven, much as an individual leader would treat his
own property (Yang, 1996). There have rarely been either policy-oriented or grass-root
parties. Instead, most all parties have been ephemeral: whenever a party leader changed,
the party disappeared. It is thus not surprising that the parties of the three dominant
presidents of the authoritarian era, Rhee Syngman’s Liberal Party, Park Chung Hee’s
                                                
13 For instance, participants in the meeting which was held on August 25, 1999, included the owner-
chairmen of the five largest chaebols, heads of the MOFE, FSC, FTC, MPB (Ministry of Planning and
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Democratic Republican Party, and Chun Doo Whan’s Democratic Justice Party have
risen and fallen with their leaders. Moreover, the raison d’être of political parties has
been the need of leaders for an instrument to gain or perpetuate power.14 For example,
Kim Dae Jung has merged and spilt his party such as Party for Peace and Democracy
(1987-1990), New Democratic Coalition Party (1990-1991), Democratic Party (1991-
1995), National Congress for New Politics (1995-2000) and New Millennium
Democratic Party (2000-) whenever he needs escaping stalemated political situation
(Y.H. Lee, 2000). Political parties have been weak, divided from each other and often
within themselves on regional lines and organized around personal cliques.
Next, the regional antagonism contributes to the continuation of centralized
personal leadership. President Kim has maintained a commanding position within his
own parties and tended to magnify the rivalries and animosities between the regions. The
level of voting support for him has closely coincided with his regional background of
Honam providence in west. In 1992 and 1997 presidential elections, for example, Kim
Dae Jung received more than 95 percent of the votes in the southwestern city of
Kwangju, 88 percent and 93 percent in the respective election from the two Honam
provinces, and less than 10 percent in 1992 and about 12 percent in 1997 from the two
Youngnam provinces in east (Sohn 1999, p.146). The previous ruling elite based on
Youngnam region has been placed by those on Honam region (S.H. Kim 2000, p.177).
To consolidate his power Kim Dae Jung ensures that his ministries are drawn largely
from his home province. The key positions in major ministries or agencies are filled by
officials either form his home region or sympathetic to his reform program. For example,
President Kim assigned the nucleus positions of power agencies, such as the NIC (Shin
Gun), Ministry of Justice (Kim Jung Nam), CPB (Lee Moo Young), ONTA (Ahn Jung
Nam), FTC (Lee Nam Ki), high ranking officials of AG (Kim Dae Woong), and Ministry
of National Defense (Kim Dong Shin) to Honam elites (Chosun Ilbo March 27, 2001).
                                                                                                                                                
Budget), the chief presidential economic adviser, and the heads of major banks, such as Hanvit, Korea
First, Korea Exchange and Korea Development Bank (Joongang Ilbo August 25, 1999).
14 There are two main vehicles for leaders of governing parties as well as opposition parties to control their
party members, money and nomination. Leaders not only have the control over the use of political funds,
but also to monopolize the power of nomination of candidates for national and local elections.
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Given the authoritarian legacies, political structure of executive dominance and
personalized party politics, the presidency remain the primary actor in major
policymaking. In fact, democratization remains largely confined to formal procedures at
the political level, failing short of economic and social democratization with broad
participation by the public. Policy formation is still monopolized by the president and his
close associates behind the scenes. This trend is intensified when decisions of the chaebol
policy are made. It will not be an easy task to break the legacy of personalized power and
the authoritarian style of top-down policymaking.
7. Path Dependence and Institutional Embeddedness
It is argued that an activist role of the state is inevitable to initiate market-oriented
reforms at least in the short term (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, and Mainwaring and
Shugart 1998). For example, distinguishing between the initiation and consolidation of
economic reforms, Haggard and Kaufman (1995) emphasize the benefits of a centralized
executive authority that can overcome political stalemate through selecting a cohesive
policy-making team, and override bureaucratic and political opposition to policy
initiation. According to them, the state has to play an active role to help the market
function well in a transition economy, during which the foundation of a market economy
is established. But, in the case of Korea, the activist state is not necessary for overcoming
economic crisis, but is continued its features from the past. From the early days of
Korean economic development firms have been largely financed by bank loans under the
state influence, and a relationship-based system has developed among firms, their banks
and the state, through ownership, family ties and political deal making.
During the restructuring process, the Kim Dae Jung government may want to
select only what is desirable from past practices and institutions. Nevertheless, the parts
of old system, which is composed of the institutional web, are so integrated that they
cannot be easily divided into separate parts for the new government to choose an efficient
solution. This is the core of my argument of institutional web model in which ideological
orientation of the state-coordinated industrial sector, bureaucratic controlled banking
sector, and president-led informal politics have continued in the chaebol restructuring
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process during the Kim Dae Jung era. Figure 1 shows the interdependent institutional
web model.
First, originating from the general public attitude and the Constitution, the Korean
state has kept its ideological orientation of state-led industrialization. Various forms of
state intervention have been tried over time, from import-substitution in the early days via
state-directed export promotion and the push for the heavy-chemical industry to the more
recent implementation of a number of the policies that go under the name of structural
adjustment. The ideology of the past developmental strategy has been persistent despite
political changes such as from an authoritarian to democratic government, and economic
changes from high economic growth to severe economic crisis. For example, in the early
1980s, when recession led to massive over-capacity in the automobile industry, the Chun
government forced some producers to exit and others to reduce the number of models and
engine sizes. Similarly, since the recent financial crisis the government has exerted great
pressure on the chaebol to exchange many of their major assets to boost economies of
scale. Recent Kim Dae Jung government’s Big Deals program follows the traditional
pattern of state-coordinated business specialization policy. Roughly speaking, the current
Kim Dae Jung government’s intervening way to the chaebol is only a shadow of its
predecessors, based on the same ideological orientation.
Second, the state has centralized financial control via formal or informal channels.
In Korea, “government control of the banks is …the single most important economic
factor explaining the distinctly subordinate position of the private sector” (Jones and
Sakong 1980, p.122). Whereas, since the main commercial banks were privatized in the
1980s, the directive intervention of the state as a financier seems to be no longer possible,
a comparatively moderate and less stifling incentive-centered intervention is still feasible.
While formal institutions may collapse or be dismantled, as was the case of the
liberalizing non-banking sector in Kim Young Sam era, informal institutions, such as
social networks and repeated operating procedures, tend to persist and continue to shape
the behavior of different actors. For example, while presidents in private banks are
apparently elected by a general meeting of the stockholders, the appointment of them is
decided by the ‘invisible hand’ of the state. They have been customarily recruited from
among ex-government officials of the MOFE (Woo-Cumings 1997). This practice puts
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these financial organizations in the hands of persons sympathetic to state persuasion.
Long-existing networks of political and economic elites, despite undergoing some shifts,
remained in place as did many of their traditional informal patterns of interaction. The
state chooses winners and losers among the chaebol due to its direct dealings with the
chaebol, and banks tend to grant loans based on which companies have political
connections rather than on which companies are able to repay. The state directs banks to
make loans to those companies that are strategically placed in the political structure.
Moreover, after the financial crisis, the state restored its control of the financial
institutions during financial restructuring process, and thus uses them as a guide to the
chaebol policy.
Third, whereas this study does not deny the increasing leverage of corporations
and civil society against the state, especially after democratization in the late 1980s, it
focuses on the powerful place of the bureaucracy in the Korean political economy as a
role of policy implementation and concentration. The bureaucratic system remains intact
both in terms of size and function (E.M. Kim 1999). Rather the only change is that the
power balance among the various ministries and officers has shifted somewhat depending
on different governments. We can trace such various organizational capacities of
bureaucratic structure, including Economic and Planning Board (EPB) in the 1970s and
1980s, FTC in the 1990s, and FSC after 1998, and other various ministries.
Finally, in Korea, power is highly concentrated in the executive branch, and
ultimately in the presidency, as Henderson (1968) points out. Policy arrangements in
Korea are often considered as a personality-driven way. The presidency has set the
direction, priorities, and objectives of economic or social policy by relying on an inner
circle of advisors around the Blue House to help lay out and execute policy strategies
(Hahm and Plein 1995). Even the bureaucracy, identified as a strong institutional
presence, has been structurally dependent on and vulnerable to presidential prerogative
(Chung 1989). All the strategic decisions and major policies are decided practically by
the president himself with the assistance of a small number of top advisors. In the past,
the president used autocratic force to enforce its decisions. For instance, after the coup of
the 1960s the new Park regime immediately pressured big businesses to confess improper
activities and ‘voluntarily’ donate part of their wealth to the state. Even after the
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democratization, presidents have not hesitated to use informal way to obtain their goal of
industrial restructuring.
Under the state’s intertwined and path dependent institutional web, the chaebol
have no way of protecting themselves. Even though the big 5 chaebols are not as
dependent on the state as they might have been, they ultimately found themselves in a
position of dependence. If the chaebol do not do what the state tells them to do, they
would be subject to credit sanctions, or other discretionary means used to bring them into
line. However, outcomes from the institutional web are not planned or intended but rather
are the consequences of unanticipated effects and constrained choice. The institutional
web follows its historical path, which is not usually a “efficient” process of moving
“rapidly to a unique solution” (March and Olsen 1984, p.734), but is much more
indeterminate and context-dependent. Although political actors build these state
institutions, there is no assurance that they will produce what they intend.
For instance, although chaebol’s chairmen’s secretary offices were officially
dismantled by the state’s pressure, virtual functions of secretary office have been
maintained for the coordination of member companies by delegating this function to one
of their core companies (Chosun Ilbo February 8, 1998). Big Deals program also has a
number of perverse consequences such as leading to greater concentration in the various
sectors, a move from oligopoly to monopoly. Moreover, after the Big Deals are over, it is
uncertain whether the state allow new entries into the industries where Big Deals have
happened: If the state allows them, it raises the question of why it ordered the Big Deals
in the first place; if not, it has to find out a logical explanation for why it cannot (Yi 1999,
pp.305-6).
8.   Conclusion
To abide by its principle of ‘parallel development of democracy and market
economy,’ the Kim Dae Jung government should have implemented the chaebol reform
in a more market-based form. However, restructuring processes have highly depended
upon the state’s hand. With the ideology based on state-led industrialization, President
Kim Dae Jung has negotiated directly with the chaebol over the restructuring plans, and
the bureaucratic system such as FSC, FTC, and MOFE has pushed corporate governance
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reforms or debt restructuring through the control of financial institutions. When
implementing chaebol reforms, the Kim government has often used informal
administrative guidance with an implicit threat of sanctions.
The institutional web model in this study argues that institutional interdependent
structures are the key to understanding how and why the state activism persists. Historical
path and institutional embeddedness have intertwined to shape profoundly the state’s
active behaviors. The legacy of the developmental state has created regulatory
administrative systems that do not bode well for the creation of market economies. The
legacy has also created an arena of political jockeying through concentrated presidential
system within the marketplace. Since each institutional feature is interdependently
embedded and structured within the web, its change is not easy task.
This study provides an analytic lens, which can be applied to other developing
countries, which have been experiencing similar economic restructuring. Like many other
countries of Asia and Latin America, Korea has experienced political and economic
changes. What role do domestic factors play in this process? If the determining factor in
industrial reforms is domestic in nature even in such a small country as Korea, then
domestic factors will most likely be the deciding consideration when countries attempt to
transform their economies. Moreover, a case study of Korea can help in understanding
similar interventionist tendencies in other countries. These states, like Korea, profess a
commitment to the free market, yet state involvement in the economy has continued in
the 2000s. This study can shed light on why that intervention persists.
27
Table 1 Progress in the Bid Deals (As of the end of December 2000)
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61 firms, including 30 in heavy industries, 8 in chemical industries, and
10 in light industries, undertook capacity adjustment, business
specialization, subcontract system improvement, and M&As through
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Source: J.W. Lee (1999, P.254) and Jwa and Seo (2000, p.330)
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